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Foreword 
Siberia's forest sector is a topic which recently has gained considerable 
international interest. 
IIASA, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Russian federal 
Forest Service, in agreement with the Russian Ministry of the 
Environment and Natural resources, signed agreements in 1992 and 
1994 to carry out a large scale study on the Siberian forest sector. The 
overall objective of the study is to focus on policy options .that would 
encourage sustainable development of the sector. The goals are to 
assess Siberia's forest resources, forest industries, and infrastructure; to 
examine the forests' economic, social, and biospheric functions; with 
these in mind, to identify possible pathways for their sustainable 
development; and to translate these pathways into policy options for 
Russian and international agencies. 
The first phase of the study concentrated on the generation of extensive 
and consistent databases of the total forest sector of Siberia and Russia. 
The study, now in its second phase, is focusing on assessment studies of 
the greenhouse gas balances, forest resources and forest utilization, 
biodiversity and landscapes, non-wood products and functions, 
environmental status, transportation infrastructure, forest industry and 
markets. and socio-economics. This report is a contribution to the 
analysis of the topic of forest industry and markets. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The forest sector of the then Soviet Union, and now Russia, has long 
fascinated timber interests from around the world. While regionally an 
important producer and trader, it is the stock of forest resource which 
has captured the imagination, ever more so now in light of drastically 
reduced harvest potentials taking place in many parts of the world 
including Canada. Collapsing industrial activity inside Russia and other 
republics of the former USSR has revealed an apparent surplus between 
what the forest resources can sustain and what the present harvest 
supporting both domestic consumption and current export levels would 
suggest. Furthermore, the capital stock utilized by the domestic forest 
sector is antiquated, and in need of replacement as that left over from the 
previous regime is consumed, thus creating opportunities for 
participation in the replacement of the capital stock. Additionally, while 
domestic consumption levels are currently quite small, rising 
consumption driven by a successful transition away from the centrally 
planned economy could well open up opportunities to service domestic 
demand by either exporting to Russia or participation in the domestic 
forest sector through joint-ventures and/or acquisition of shares of 
Russian companies. 
Opportunities for extensive development of the forest resource exist in 
the eastern portion of the country, most likely with an eye towards 
servicing the Pacific Rim market. High relative transportation tariffs will 
likely conspire in the short term to limit export potential to the western 
parts of Russia unless substantial value adding activities can be 
performed on the resource. With the largest part of the population 
located in the western reaches of the country, shorter transportation 
distances may favour a focus on the domestic market in the longer term. 
Rising consumption brought on by a successful contract among the 
various participants of the Russian house will collide with a less flexible 
wood supply, thus leading to rising prices for the wood raw material. 
Securing long-term commitments for a wood supply at a time when 
supply is not as critical an issue could yield large dividends to those bold 
souls willing to brave the Russian environment at this stage. 
However, despite the widely recognized potential in Russia, and .the flood 
of foreign investment, many questions remain concerning the realization 
of the potential. The success or failure of a joint-venture, or a Russian 
company in which a foreign organization has a recognizable share, can 
be affected by a number of institutional factors generic to Russia. 
First, while selection of the right location can often place one far away 
from the bureaucratic jungle in Moscow, it does not necessarily translate 
into an escape from bureaucracy at the local level. Even though the 
centre in Moscow is attractive, and should be factored into any serious 
investment strategy, local authorities with new powers can have an even 
greater impact on the day to day activities of an investment. 
Second, the selection of the right partner who can navigate the labyrinths 
of Russian society is crucial. An undeveloped wholesale market can 
make sourcing of even the most basic of supplies problematic 
particularly if the enterprise has been unable to establish some form of 
vertical integration. Additionally, administrative impediments, vestiges 
from the relationship society which has evolved in Russia, can place a 
high premium on the former employment history and educational 
background of the Russian partner. Many of the managers under the 
former regime have surfaced as players in the new environment in 
Russia. Prior relationships can expect to have a large impact on the 
willingness of these emerging leaders of the post Soviet Russia to work 
together. 
Third, .the cultural differences that exist between Russian and non- 
Russian alike are still important. Empathy and feeling good about a 
relationship among business partners are important factors in a society 
which has long functioned under a relationship paradigm. Cultural 
illsensitivity can effectively neutralize this feeling of good will, and lead to 
endless rounds of misinterpretation and misunderstanding as the trust 
building paradigm is repeated. 
Fourthly, the structure of the deal is important since assets have been 
sharply undervalued when considering the relationship between the 
ruble and the dollar. There is a need to recognize purchase power parity 
of the ruble and not take a literal translation of the value contributed by 
the Russian partner by applying the exchange rate to the ruble price in 
the domestic market. A feeling that the foreign partner is trying to 
depreciate the contribution of the Russian partner can effectively 
introduce a large impediment to the relationship, destroying the trust on 
which many relationships are based. 
Fifth, motivation of the workers is important given the socialistic 
environment under which employees have operated. Motivation of local 
workers with the proper incentives cannot be overlooked since under the 
communist system a great leveling took place. 
Finally, foresight is crucial, particularly concerning those firms which 
must rely on a number of raw material inputs. The absence of a well 
defined wholesale market has placed a high premium on vertical 
integration either through control of the actual assets producing the raw 
material input or through a person who has an intimate knowledge and 
historical link with the major players in the supply line. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The removing of the veil which long shrouded the former USSR, and now 
Russia, has continued since initiated during the tenure of Gorbachev. 
Subsequen.tly continued and expanded under Yeltsen, the opportunities 
revealed and created by the transition from the centrally planned 
economy to the market oriented have been widely documented, although 
the early experiences have been mixed.1 The acceleration of reform and 
the continuing of the privatization process has wetted the appetite of 
many an entrepreneur who sees Russia as a land of opportunity.2 This 
interest has also found a resting place in the forest sector.3 
The forest sector of the ,then Soviet Union, and now Russia, has long 
fascinated timber interests from around the world. While regionally an 
important producer and trader, it is the stock of forest resource which 
has captured the imagination, ever more so now in light of drastically 
reduced harvest potentials taking place in many parts of .the world 
including Canada.4 Collapsing industrial activity inside Russia and other 
republics of the former USSR has revealed an apparent surplus between 
what the forest resources can sustain and what the present harvest 
supporting both domestic consumption and current export levels would 
suggest.5 Furthermore, the capital stock utilized by the domestic forest 
sector is antiquated, and in need of replacement as that left over from the 
previous regime is consumed, thus creating opportunities for 
participation in the replacement of the capital stock. 6 Additionally, while 
l ~ v i n t ,  Vladmir, Don't give up on Russia, The Harvard Business Review, March-April 1994, pp. 62-74 
2 ~ c ~ a y ,  Betsy, Betting on roulette, Newsweek, August 1, 1994, pp. 18-19 
3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  Russian timber industry hungers for international joint ventures, Panel World, September 1 9 9 2 ,  
pp. 24-27; Read, Richard, Northwest timber firms sharpen saws for Russian forests, The Oregonian. October 
11, 1993, p. A8; Abusow, Kathy, Fertile ground for investment in Russia's vast forests, PPI, January 1 9 9 5 ,  
pp. 48-51 
4 ~ u s h ,  Patricia, Forester has to chop the cut, The Globe and Mail ,  March 30, 1995, p. B8; Apsey, Mike and 
Reed, Les, World timber resources outlook - Current perceptions. A discussion paper, Vancouver: Council of 
Forest Industries (COFI), 1994, 160 pp.; Sutton, W. (Wink) R.J., The world's need for wood, Unpublished 
paper presented at Portland, Oregon on November 1, 1993 to the Forest Products Society's conference, "The 
Globalization of Wood...", Rotorua: Forestry, 1993, 20 pp. 
S ~ a c k m a n ,  Charles A., The Russian forest resource - physical accessibility by economic region, Contract 
report for Canadian Department of Industry, 1994, pp. 179; Backman, Charles A., The Russian forest sector: 
a bear for all seasons ..., March 1995, pp. 30,  paper presented at the CPPA Annual Woodlands Meeting,  
MontrCal, QuC. 
6 ~ o l o c h n i k o v ,  Yu.A.. Sostoyanie i otsenka nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa v otraslyakh Iesnogo 
koinpleksa (Composition and appraisal of the scientific-technological progress in the forest sector), p. 7 9 ;  
Sominskogo, V.S., Ekonornika tsellyulozno-burnazhnoy prornyshlennosti (Economics of the pulp and paper 
industry), p. 37; Backman, Charles A., Analysis of importing coniferous veneer and plywood from the  
domestic consumption levels are currently quite small, rising 
consumption driven by a successful transition away from the centrally 
planned economy could well open up opportunities to service domestic 
demand by either exporting to Russia or participation in the domestic 
forest sector through j oint-ventures and/or acquisition of shares of 
Russian companies. 
During the challenging times brought on by the re-appraisal of the forest 
resource and the roles it plays in society, much uncertainty remains 
concerning the potential role to be played by the forest sector in Russia. 
This report focuses on emerging investment opportunities and challenges 
for the international forest sector created by the ongoing transformation 
taking place inside Russia. 
The report is divided into 5 parts beginning with 1. Introduction. Part 2. 
Background provides a historical perspective to investment inside 
Russia, while part 3. Administrative Factors examines some of the 
structural impediments affecting the investment decision, including the 
lessons which can be learned from previous experience. Part 4. Forest 
Sector provides an overview of the sector revealing the fundamentals 
supporting the opportunities latent in Russia. Part 5. Opportunities 
provides an overview of which in sectors opportunities may exist. 
Russian Far East and East Siberia into the west coast of the United States, p. 46-48 
2.0 BACKGROUND 
Perestroika, glasnost', and uskorenie, symbolizing the urgency 
necessary to reinvigorate the economy, adopted symbolic significance 
during the Gorbachev era (1985-1991). Efforts begun in the middle of the 
last decade with such high hopes were by the end of the 1980s showing 
signs of wear. The economy of the then USSR was in shambles. Nearly 
30 percent of the people were living below the official poverty line at the 
end of 1989, estimated to be US $1,920 at the official exchange rate of 
1.6 dollars per ruble.7 By 1993, the proportion had increased to some 90 
percent of the population.8 Not only was the economy morbid, but the 
general environment which supported social activity was endangered.9 
The agricultural sector, with a potential to feed the nation, was 
struggling. l o  
Declining growth with ever higher investment was painting a picture of 
an economy soon to be eclipsed.ll The leadership of the then USSR was 
not unaware of the looming crisis, realizing that foreign investment and 
technology would be needed if the Soviet Union were to be a serious 
contender in the global economy of the 21 St century.12 
Such companies as MacDonald's, Nokia, PepsiCola, and Phibro 
EnergyJAnglo-Suisse were among the first foreign organizations to 
become established in a major way inside the then Soviet Union.13 
Despite the cyclical variations in high level support to the reformation of 
the then Soviet Economy, other companies continued to investigate 
opportunities. Such companies included Daimler-Benz, KPMG Marwick, 
Peugeot, and Sieman~.l4~15 
7 ~ e n t z e r ,  Susan and Trimble, Jeff, The Soviet economy in shambles, Y.S. News & World R e ~ o r t ,  November 
20, 1989, p. 25 
8 ~ v i n t ,  Vladimir. Don't give up on Russia, The Harvard Business Review, March-April 1994, p. 62 
9 ~ h e  World Bank, A study of the Soviet economy, Volume 3, pp. 1-29 
1 0 ~ r e g o r y ,  Paul and Stuart, Robert, Soviet economic structure and performance, 3 rd edition, pp. 267-289 
l ~ h m e l e v ,  Nikolai, and Popov. Vladimir, The Turning Point, p. 306 
2 ~ o r b a c h e v ,  Mi khail, Perestroika, pp. 17-25 
I3h?elcher, Richard et alia, From gung-ho to uh-oh, Business Week, February I 1, 1991, p. 43 
14/bid., 43 
I 5 ~ h e  major impacts connected with the fluctuating political climate were through withdrawal of credit 
guarantees from such government backed organizations as the US Export-Import Bank and the UK's Credit 
guarantee Department. 
While the reform process continued into the fall of 1990, increasing 
resistaiice of the people holding positions identified on the nomenklatura 
eventually compelled Gorbachev to shift back to a more rigid policy not 
only with the foreign community but also with the Russian pe0ples.16~17 
January 1991 gave more substance to the shifting policies with more 
reliance on the military and para military to maintain order. The 
pendulum towards greater centralized control eventually resulted in the 
ill fated coup attempt of August 1991. 
While reformers eventually were returned to power, the failed coup 
served to accelerate the disintegration of the old power structures, 
creating new obstacles to the promulgation of joint ventures while easing 
others. Following the demise of the USSR, the process of reform 
continued with increasing speed under the tenure of Yeltsen. However, 
as the state disintegrated, structures long taken as part of the 
background environment failed to materialize.18 
Liberalization of the financial markets and the introduction and 
initialization of the privatization process have heightened interest in a 
country with bountiful natural resources, a well educated work force, 
and a transportational infrastructure which may not be as inefficient as  
some belie~e.19~20 From some 200 million dollars of foreign investment in 
1992, by 1994 about 2 billion dollars is believed to have been invested 
inside Russia by foreign concerns. 21 The return to life of the Russian 
Constitutional Court in February 1995 (since being suspended during the 
October 1993 Parliamentary uprising) is another sign of Russia 
continuing along the path to a law governed state. 22 Large US concerns 
such as IBM, GE, Ford, HP, and Eastman Kodak have a presence, while 
six of the major international accounting firms have offices in Russia in 
1 6 ~ h e  nomenklatura were the key posts in  all areas of the government and economy. The nomenklatura was 
dominated by members of the Communist Party Apparat, the 5 percent of the Party members who worked full 
time for the Party under the leadership of the Secretary (Christian, David, Power and privilege, p. 231). 
7 ~ r a d y ,  Rose and Galuszka, Shattered dreams, Business Week, February 1 1 ,  1991, p. 41 
1 8 ~ h e  Economist, Russia's Mafia, The Economist, July 9, 1994, pp. 19-22; The Economist, Russia's 
crumbling financial pyramid, The Economist, July 30, 1994, pp. 67-68 
1 9 ~ r a n z ,  Patricia, Russia's state sell-off: 'It's sink-or-swim time', Business Week, July 4, 1994, p. 16-17 
2 0 ~ h e  Harvard Business Review, The Russian investment dilemma, The Harvard Business Review, May-June 
1994, p. 40 
IMcKay, Betsy, Betting on roulette, Newsweek, August 1, 1994, p.19 
2 2 ~ h e  Economist, Rights arrive, The Economist. February 18, 1995, p. 51 
order to service the Russian market better.23 CS First Boston, a 
significant player in the international financial world, has had a major 
presence in the burgeoning financial market? First Boston was 
instrumental in the recent acquisition of A 0  Volga, a producer of one- 
third of Russia's newsprint, by among other foreign investors, Herlitz 
International Trading (HIT) .25 
Continuation of the privatization process has added fuel to the increasing 
interest by foreigners in the Russian market.26 The continuation of the 
sell-off of state assets with the opportunity for direct foreign ownership 
has heighten interest of both foreigners and Russians alike, although the 
nascent market structures have not been without flaws. 27 Furthermore, 
the disintegration of the old structures and the yet to appear new ones to 
take their place is in some ways decreasing the overall appeal to the 
foreign investor, and indeed, disenfranchising many of the early 
supporters of the reform process.28.29 Indeed, the experience of both 
Weyerhaeuser and Hyundai, reviewed in the next part, provide an 
illustrative example of some of the pitfalls for those companies which 
have been embroiled in Russia under the former and current regimes.30 
More recently, the rights of shareholders have been unclear and the 
opportunities to dispose of shares has been undeveloped except for the 
50 largest companies.31 Opportunities to profit at the expense of 
unsophisticated shareholders has been high, aptly described through the 
saga of AO-MMM.32 Despite these high profile events, Russia continues 
2 3 ~ h e  Harvard Business Review, The Russian investment dilemma, The Harvard Business Review, May-June 
1994, p. 42 
2 4 ~ h e  Economist, The loneliness of being first, The Economist, September 24, 1994, p. 78 
2 5 ~ h e  Economist, A survey of Russia's emerging market - A silent revolution, April 8, 1995, Survey p. 9 
2 6 ~ h e  Economist, The problem of Polevanov, The Economist, January 7, 1995, p. 60-61; The Economist, 
The loneliness of being first, m c o n o m i s t .  September 24, 1994, p.78 
2 7 ~ r a n z ,  Patricia, Russia's state sell-off: 'It's sink-or-swim time', m s s  Week, July 4, 1994, p. 16-17; 
Rossant, Juliette, In Moscow, it's location, location, location, Business Week, July 25, 1994, p. 20 
28~edarko,  Kevin, Aviation: Russian air roulette, m, April 18, 1994, p. 50 
2 9 ~ ~ ~ i o t t ,  Dorinda, '1 believe in nothing' - Russia: A lost generation, pewsweek, July 1 1 ,  1994, p. 10 
3 0 ~ a k ,  Kwang-il, Foreign investment in the forest sector in the Russian Far East and potential market 
integration with Northeast Asia, p. 43-62; Read, Richard, The Weyerhaeuser deal: Part one, The Sunday 
Oregonian, October 10, 1993, p. A I ,  A32; Read, Richard, The Weyerhaeuser deal: Part two, The Oregonian, 
p. A l ,  A8 
3 1 ~ h e  Economist, Russian Stock market: The problem of Polevanov, The Economist, January 7, 1995, p .  
60-61 
3 2 ~ h e  Economist, Back from the grave, The Ec-, September 10, 1994, p. 88-93; The Economist, 
to attract the attention and interest of not only people in the West, but 
entrepreneurs and ordinary citizens in Russia.33 
However, despite the widely recognized potential in Russia, and the flood 
of foreign investment, many questions remain concerning the realization 
of the potential. The next section illuminates some of the more common 
pitfalls which have frustrated the formation of joint-ventures in Russia to 
date, and can still be expected to impede the operation of enterprises in 
which foreign concerns have a recognizable stake through .the 
acquisition of shares. 
Russia's crumbling financial pyramid, The Economist, July 30,  1994, p. 67-68 
3 3 ~ h e  Economist, Survey: Russia's emerging market, April 8 ,  1995. 
3.0 ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS 
The success or failure of a joint-venture, or a Russian company in which 
a foreign organization has a recognizable share, can be affected by a 
number of institutional factors generic to Russia. This section provides a 
historical review of the success or failure of joint-ventures in the former 
Soviet Union, and now Russia. before examining some of the common 
factors which have interfered with joint-venture formation and can be 
expected to affect the operations of companies in which foreigners have 
invested a recognizable share. The experience of two forest product 
organizations foreign to Russia and which had interests in the Russian 
Far East are presented in terms of the generic factors discussed. 
The legal framework supporting the establishment of joint-ventures 
inside the former Soviet Union pre-dates the Gorbachev era when 
Andropov adopted a decree permitting joint ventures with CMEA 
countries.34 While introducing the supporting legislation in 1983, it was 
not until 1985 that the first two of such organizational structures 
appeared.35 The drive to improve the flow of goods and services from the 
centrally planned systems acted as impetus for further decrees 
permitting the creation of joint ventures in the former Soviet Union. From 
January 1987 when another two decrees authorizing joint ventures 
appeared, it was possible for both CMEA countries and other countries 
to participate in joint vent~res.36~37 
The initial reception by the foreign community to the joint venture 
regulation was muted, due to the onerous conditions attached to the joint 
venture formation. The number of negative conditions linked to the joint 
34Asland, Anders, 1989, Gorbachev's struggle for economic reform, p. 140 
35~bid., p. 140 
361bid., p. 140 
3 7 ~ ~ ~ ~  is short for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The CMEA was formed in 1949 as a 
vehicle through which to promote increasing integration of Eastern European countries with the former 
Soviet Union. As with the USSR, the CMEA is no longer relevant when examining current affairs in Eastern 
European of countries belonging to the former Soviet Union. A brief discussion of the CMEA and trade during 
the Soviet era are to be found in: Gregory, Paul R. and Stuart, Robert C.,  Soviet economic structure and 
performance, 3 rd edition, pp. 291-317; Shmelev, Nikolai and Popov. Vladimir, The turning point - 
Revitalizing the Soviet economy, pp. 220-246; and Asland, Anders, Gorbachev's struggle for economic 
reform, pp. 136-141 
ventures included: (I) the Soviet share of an enterprise had to be greater 
than 51 percent; (2) the president of the board and the managing director 
had to be Soviet citizens; and (3) the joint venture would be subject to 
the ordinary legal environment, thus exposing the foreign partner to a 
myriad of laws and regulations which were beyond its ability to see.38 
By December 1987, only 23 joint ventures had been registered, reaching 
193 by the end of 1988. Changes in the legislative umbrella at the end of 
1988 helped to ease some of the concern sparked by the initial legislation, 
propelling the number of registered joint ventures to 1,754 by the middle 
of 1990.39 
By the end of 1989, the initial enthusiasm had begun to wane though, 
replaced by a sobering assessment of the obstacles which needed to be 
surmounted or finessed. By the middle of 1992, three obstacles unique to 
Russia continued to plague the investment environment in Russia. They 
were (I) currency convertibility, (2) supply shortages; and (3) the 
constantly shifting regulatory climate. 
Although the number of registered joint-ventures had grown, it was not 
the number of registered joint ventures, but the number of those which 
were actually operating which was lagging. Officially, by the middle of 
1990, only 541 fit into this category, accounting for some 30 percent of all 
those registered. More alarming was the nature of the joint ventures, 
most of which were smaller and had less capitalization than either 
international or the then Soviet standard.40 
Despite the shift back to a more hard line approach to the management 
of the Soviet economy during 1990 and 1991 and the unsuccessful coup 
towards the end of 1991, the number of operating joint ventures climbed 
from 541 in June 1990 to more than 2,500 at the end of 1992.41 The rise of 
Yeltsen and ,the demise of the former Soviet Union coupled with strong 
support for the reform process helped to spur operating joint ventures to 
38Asland, Anders, 1989, Gorbachev's struggle for economic reform, p. 140 
3 9 ~ h e  World Bank, A study of the Soviet economy, Volume 2, p. 102 
40/bid., p. 76-78 
41Goskomstat Rossii, Rossiyskaya federatsiya v 1992 g.,(Statistical handbook of the Russian Federation i n  
1992) p. 62 
4,000 by the end of 1993.42 By 1993, the share of the registered joint 
ventures which were actually operating had increased from one-third in 
1990 to almost 80 percent while the financial markets continued to 
develop. 43 .44 
3.2 FACTORS AFFECTING THE SUCCESS OF JOINT-VENTURES 
However, the success of these numbers belies the dismal record of those 
joint ventures successfully passing through all stages in the process. Only 
some 8 percent of those organizations which started along the path to 
joint venturdom between 1989 and 1993 actually completed the 
journey .45 
Almost 40 percent of the organizations which started along the path to 
JV dom failed to complete the journey due to the right partner. Legal and 
bureaucratic problems accouilted for one-quarter of the failed 
organizations while insufficient capitalization represented one-fifth of all 
organizations. Only one organization in twenty broke off the relationship 
due to an unfavourable feasibility study. 
Despite the dismal record of successfully completed joint ventures, much 
of the record has been credited to poor planning on the part of the foreign 
partner.46 Furthermore, the climate for investment may becoming 
decidedly favourable since between 35 and 38 percent of all joint 
ventures formed between 1989 and 1993 are already profitable or well 
on their way.47 
However, despite the favourable conditions, investment receives a 
mixed review.48 While the potential was widely recognized, a number of 
obstacles were highlighted which form a structural impediment to 
42~ys t r iy t sk iy ,  S.P. and Lutsenko, L.N., Sovmestnye predpriyatiya v lesnoy industrii Dal'nego Vostoka 
(Joint-ventures in the forest industry of the Far East), 1994, p.12 
4 3 ~ h e  Economist, High stakes on the high steppe, The Economist, October 16, 1993, p. 77-81 
44~ys t r iy t sk iy .  S.P. and Lutsenko, L.N., Sovmestnye predpriyatiya v lesnoy industrii Dal'nego Vostoka 
(Joint-ventures in the forest industry of the Far East), 1994, p.12 
4 5 ~ v i n t ,  Vladmir, Don't give up on Russia, The Harvard Business Review, March-April 1994, 64 
461bid., p. 63 
47~bid . ,  p. 62 
4 8 ~ h e  Harvard Business Review, 'The Russian investment dilemma, The Harvard Business Review. May-June 
1994, p.35-44 
unfettered investment. Although recognizing the skills resident in the 
domestic workforce, and finding the existing infrastructure not nearly as  
poorly off as was once thought, it is the investment climate which is 
causing the most angst. 
The absence of a commercial code, increasing concern with 
disintegration of law and order and an unwillingness to participate in 
international business according to normally acceptable behaviour were 
having their toll. Unstable economic conditions linked to hyper inflation 
and a fluctuating exchange rate were shortening the investment horizon. 
Bureaucratic decision making and the absence of legal protection for 
investment were conspiring to limit the inflow of capital. The tax climate 
and overlapping authority for taxation among the different levels of 
government were often siphoning away the margin needed by 
organizations to compensate for the risk. The absence of modern 
commercial law which often facilitates transactions, the emerging 
corporate structures often lacking any vision or corporate culture which 
can be used to harness the energy latent in the employees, and existing 
accounting structure is not geared to a modern interpretation of value, 
making assessment of net worth difficult. 
While joint-ventures which have been successfully promulgated appear 
to be on the whole a good advertisement for seriously considering 
investment in Russia, the success appears to depend on at least six 
fundamental factors, presented below, which need to be adequately 
addressed .49 
First, while selection of the right location can often place one far away 
from the bureaucratic jungle in Moscow, it does not necessarily translate 
into an escape from bureaucracy at the local level. Even though the 
centre in Moscow is attractive, and should be factored into any serious 
investment strategy, local authorities with new powers can have an even 
greater impact on the day to day activities of an investment. 
Second, the selection of the right partner who can navigate the labyrinths 
of Russian society is crucial. An undeveloped wholesale market can 
make sourcing of even the most basic of supplies problematic 
4 9 ~ v i n t ,  Vladrnir, Don't give up on Russia, The Harvard B u s i n e u e v i e w ,  March-April 1994, pp. 70-74 
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particularly if the enterprise has been unable to establish some form of 
vertical integration. Additionally, administrative impediments, vestiges 
from the relationship society which has evolved in Russia, can place a 
high premium on the former employment history and educational 
background of the Russian partner. Many of the managers under the 
former regime have surfaced as players in the new environment in 
Russia. Prior relationships can expect to have a large impact on the 
willingness of these emerging leaders of .the post Soviet Russia to work 
together. 
Third, the cultural differences that exist between Russian and non- 
Russian alike are still important. Empathy and feeling good about a 
relationship among business partners are important factors in a society 
which has long functioned under a relationship paradigm. Cultural 
insensitivity can effectively neutralize this feeling of good will, and lead to 
endless rounds of misinterpretation and misunderstanding as the trust 
building paradigm is repeated. 
Fourthly, the structure of .the deal is important since assets have been 
sharply undervalued when considering the relationship between the 
ruble and the dollar.50 There is a need to recognize purchase power 
parity of the ruble and not take a literal translation of the value 
contributed by the Russian partner by applying the exchange rate to the 
ruble price in the domestic market. A feeling that the foreign partner is 
trying to depreciate the contribution of the Russian partner can 
effectively introduce a large impediment to the relationship, destroying 
the trust on which many relationships are based. 
Fifth, motivation of the workers is important given the socialistic 
environment under which employees have operated. Motivation of local 
workers with the proper incentives cannot be overlooked since under the 
communist system a great leveling took place. 
Finally, foresight is crucial, particularly concerning those firms which 
must rely on a number of raw material inputs. The absence of a well 
defined wholesale market has placed a high premium on vertical 
integration either through control of the actual assets producing the raw 
5 0 ~ h e  Economist, Russia's emerging market survey, April 8, 1995, p. 15-16 
material input or through a person who has an intimate knowledge and 
historical link with the major players in the supply line. 
3.3 THE FOREST SECTOR TWIST 
Many of the generic observations and factors presented above find 
substance in the experiences of two initiatives taking place in the forest 
sector. Following a brief overview of the exposure of the global market 
place to Russian forest products, the experiences of Hyundai and 
Weyerhaeuser are presented for illustrative purposes. 
3.3.1 Exposure to the international market place 
The forest sector of Russia has been long known to the international 
community through the activities of Eksportles.51 Primarily it was this 
organization which was vested with the responsibility of interfacing with 
the domestic industry in order to meet foreign demands for wood and 
paper products. Through the efforts of Eksportles, consumers in Europe 
and Pacific Rim countries were able to appreciate the products and 
potential of the forest sector. 
However attractive the market acceptance of Russian forest products in 
these export markets, participation in the potential of the Russian forest 
sector is not without its travails, amply evident from .the experience of 
two large forest firms active since the last half of the 1980s. Both of these 
firms encountered obstacles to the continuation of their project, and in 
one instance leading to the cessation of the initiative. The following 
provides an overview to the Hyundai and Weyerhaeuser projects placing 
the generic observations presented earlier in some context. 
Hyundai interest in the former Soviet Union has its origins in the thawing 
of relations at the governmental level preceding and immediately 
following the Olympic games in Seoul in 1988. While links between South 
Korea and the former Soviet Union were formally possible since 1973, 
trade between the two countries was minor, amounting in 1980 to only 
5 1 ~ 1 ~  Exportles, VIO Exportles 1926-1986, MOSCOW, 93 pp. 
36 million dollars. Trade levels grew since then reaching nearly 400 
million dollars by 1988 and 600 million dollars by 1989. However the 
overall contribution to South Korea trade has been minor, amounting in 
1989 to only 0.5 percent of total South Korean turnover. 
A number of high level missions visited the Soviet Union searching for 
sectors and opportunities which could serve as recipients of South 
Korean investment. Two areas were highlighted as possible recipients 
for Korean investment. These areas were coal and forestry.52 
Hyundai, despite the numerous difficulties encountered by other 
organizations from other countries, optimistically proceeded with the 
forestry project in Primorskiy Kray . Their partner, Primorsklesprom , 
was the regional forest industrial sector organization, well connected 
with the local government and could have been expected to be familiar 
with the political environment in Moscow as well as the legal framework 
affecting management of the forest resource. Primorsklesprom, having a 
good understanding of the then existing environment within which the 
joint venture would be operating, appeared an ideal partner for Hyundai 
according to the conditions of the time. 
While the joint venture was being processed through the then Soviet 
system, political changes at a national level led to the demise of the 
Soviet Union, and the emergence of new power structures from the 
aftermath of the collapse. Continual fragmentation of the centrally 
planned system, and the evolving democratic structures in Russia 
resulted in increasing contacts among Russian organizations and 
between organizations inside Russia and those in the global arena. 
International organizations with an environmental focus developed a 
strong interest in the environmental role played by forest development. 
Forging lirks with the indigenous peoples, the joint venture stumbled 
when the rights of the first peoples were ignored, despite existing 
legislation to the contrary. International environmental groups, 
capitalizing on the predicaments of the local people, and in concert with 
domestic environmental movement support were able to limit the initial 
5 2 ~ e e  Woo-Sik, Current Status and Prospects of South-Korean Trade, Sino-Soviet Affairs, Vol. XIV, No. 3 
Fall 1990, p. 16-17. 
developmental plans of Hyundai. The annual harvest levels were sharply 
reduced from a planned one million cubic meters to some 250 thousand 
cubic meters. While Hyundai has been continuing at the 250 thousand 
cubic meter level, the experience illustrates two issues. 
First, the selection of the joint venture partner is important, especially the 
links which it has with Russian society. Furthermore, it is not the linkages 
with the current regime which are important, but the existence or lack 
there of with groups which may be presently disadvantaged. A change in 
the regime effectively negated years of effort placing the operation on a 
holding pattern at best while new relationships are forged and trust 
rebuilt.53 Hyundai was captive of their Russian joint venture partner and 
the history which it brought to the relationship. 
Second, the large scale operation, affecting the land itself, attracted 
much interest at a time when very little collective knowledge existed in 
Russia concerning .the behaviour of foreign organizations. Development 
of the natural resources by a non-Russian company, about which not 
very much was known by the local people, became a potent symbol 
through which to marshal support for the protection of "mother Russia". 
The opportunity to learn about, absorb, and understand the paradigms 
underlying every day life and those underlying the commercial world in 
Russia by Hyundai, or of those affecting Hyundai by the Russian peoples, 
was not sufficient. Rather than pursu.ing their Russian venture initially in a 
small way, allowing for a learning curve and adjustment process by 
organizations and people with stakes in the resource and operation of the 
joint-venture, Hyundai embarked on their turn key operation. 
The interest of Weyerhaeuser in the timber resources of the Far East 
commenced in the late 1980s. While negotiations continued throughout 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, further development beyond focusing on 
53-rhe process of bringing together the different groups with an interest in resource management, and through 
consensus, creating a paradigm supporting their ongoing use, is at the centre of the Russian Model Forest 
Initiative of the Canadian Government. By drawing together the different threads of society, as one group 
sees their influence diminishing, the effect on the management of the resource should not lead to a 
discontinuity. Interests with rising influence should not see the need to radically restructure the contract 
underlying management of the natural resources since their concerns should have already been accommodated 
in some manner. 
the Koppinskiy lesokombinat on the coast of Khabarovsk Kray was 
frustrated.54 
The prospective Russian partner(s) were part of the old system 
responsible for managing the forest sector of the Far East. Well aware of 
the differences existing then between prices available for their products 
in Japan, South Korea, and China, and the cost of producing the products 
in Russia, the Russian partner was unprepared to accept the low 
stumpage prices being offered to them by Weyerhaeuser. 
Weyerhaeuser, basing their offer on a vector of costs and prices linked to 
the global market place, believed that in the long run the price of goods 
and services in Russia would rise in the short term to reflect supply and 
demand at an international level. Consequently, basing an offer on 
sourcing goods and services at prices existing in Russia that were not 
expected to be available over the planning horizon meant that much of 
.the surplus evident in .the early 1990s when comparing .the cost of 
production in Russia with the prices available in Japan would disappear 
as the adjustment process in Russia continued. The Russian side, not 
unexpectedly, was focusing on the wide differential existing then 
between the cost of delivering the wood and the price realizable in the 
international market. Raised in an environment surrounded by 
administered costs and prices, the thought of a rapidly rising cost and 
price structure in the domestic market was difficult to accept. 
The crumbling state planning system, while providing opportunities to 
Weyerhaeuser to deal directly with the management of the individual 
enterprise, also provided the opportunities to senior members of the 
forest sector from the old system to monopolize on the weakening of the 
centrally planned system. While on the surface the approach by 
Weyerhaeuser to shift the focus of their negotiations to an enterprise 
level of organization seemed appropriate, .the lack of clear property rights 
was another hurdle which lay before it.55 
5 4 ~ h i ~ e  having good timber resource base, the Koppinskiy lesokombinat was located right on the coast of 
Khabarovskiy Kray. Consequently, not on1 y was the need to rely on the local transportational network 
effectively minimized, but there was also direct access to  the location from the water. The delivery of supplies 
by-passing the local distribution network was accordingly an option. 
55~ni t ia l ly ,  the people with whom Weyerhaeuser was interacting were located within one of the two 
association responsible for the forest management in the Russia Far East. The management of t h i s  
organization was through enterprises which were responsible for the industrial activity in the forest .  
Consequently, control and "ownership" was vested at the association level of organization. 
Without a clear idea of who the players were that needed to be dealt 
with, Weyerhaeuser became captive of the local environment. Not only 
was Weyerhaeuser unsure of the process, but Russian organizations 
were also unsure of the new territory into which Russian society was 
entering. Consequently, the links among the former holders of the 
decision making apparatus continued to exert influence beyond that 
which would seemingly be possible given .the emerging opportunities to 
deal directly with the enterprise management. The possibility to deal 
directly with the enterprise management as privatization continued was 
denied them because of unclear property rights and a legal system and 
commercial code which was not similar to that existing in .the US. 
Furthermore, the desire to actively develop a harvesting area, including 
employing their own management approach created the opportunity for 
international environmentalists to enlist the support of local stockholders 
in the management and use of the natural resources. The local forest 
community was unfamiliar with the approach of Weyerhaeuser and 
consequently needed to examine the approaches in a more rigorous way 
before accepting .them. The debates and discussioils created endless 
delays, finally resulting in a cessation of the Weyerhaeuser initiative. 
The examples revealed by Weyerhaeuser help to highlight four of the 
points mentioned earlier. First, although selecting .the Far East as a 
region on which to focus attention, far removed from Moscow, the local 
bureaucracy proved equally formidable. 
Secondly, and linked to the first point, Weyerhaeuser initiated the 
negotiation process with one group of people and under a different 
political, economic, and social regime. Both sides of the negotiating 
process were employing different paradigms when valuating the as sets 
under discussion. Weyerhaeuser was applying their understanding of 
costs available to them, recognizing that the vector of costs and prices 
evident in the Russian Far East at the time were unlikely to hold over the 
time horizon of the investment. The Russian side, growing up in a 
completely different economic, social, and political environment, under 
As the centrally planned system disintegrated, management control began to flow towards the enterprise level 
of organization. Consequently, it was not the association which was likely to have "ownership" of the 
assets, but the enterprise which was actually using them. However, the process of transferring ownership was 
not clearly defined or clearly understood. Thus, while in theory the local management and employees were 
being vested with property rights, it was not evident how this would take place in practice. 
which prices and costs were administered, were unprepared to accept 
that there would be a rapid adjustment process as the interface between 
Russia and the rest of the world became more porous. The large scale 
nature of the project, coupled with the absence of a common 
understanding of the paradigms to be employed in managing the 
relationship, including those affecting sourcing of goods and services 
over the longer term, increased the risk of accepting one paradigm over 
the other, or in accepting a compromise one. 
Thirdly, in attempting to by-pass the group of people with which initial 
contact had been established, the strong relationship nature of Russian 
society was not fully appreciated. There was ample opportunity for the 
negotiation process to be frustrated and drawn out since there were a 
myriad of governmental regulations which needed to be addressed 
before operations could commence. Furthermore, the institutional 
structures to support privatization and management under a 
decentralized paradigm were not wholly familiar in Russia, thus inviting a 
pedantic approach to the distribution of assets, particularly beyond that 
identified with the Russian peoples. 
Fourthly, the management philosophy planned for the forest resource 
was not completely familiar to the forest sector establishment in the 
Russian Far East, thus opening the doors to endless discussion 
concerning the merits of applying a foreign approach to management of 
the natural resources of Russia. Since the project was such a large scale, 
it tended to occupy the attention of people, raising concerns of cultural 
domination. There was little opportunity for assimilatioil and education 
that a smaller operation would have offered, posing less risk to 
experimentation. 
4.0 FOREST SECTOR 
Opportunities in the forest sector reveal themselves through a 
description of the background environment. The following chapter 
provides an overview of the Russian forest sector demonstrating that the 
fundamentals appear to support a positive investment decision. 
The forest resources are presented first in section 4.1 while section 4.2 
examines the fiber supply. The domestic consumption and exportable 
surplus are presented in section 4.3. 
4.1 FOREST RESOURCES 
The forest resources of Russia are first placed in a global perspective, 
commenting on the degree to which they dominate the global coniferous 
resource. The Russian forest resources are then examined in the context 
of their ability to support annual growth and by inference an annual 
harvest. 
4.1.1 The Global Perspective 
Russia, accounting for almost one-quarter of the global forest resources, 
contains 771 million hectares of stocked forest land and 82 billion cubic 
meters of growing stock. While representing nearly 10 percent of the 
world's deciduous forest resource, evident from Figure 4.1 and Figure 
4.2, some 50 percent of the coniferous stocked forest land and growing 
stock are concentrated within her boundaries. When the size of the 
tropical forest resource is excluded from the deciduous total, Russia 
accounts for about 20 percent of the remaining non-coniferous stocked 
forest land and one-third of the concomitant growing stock.56 
4.1.2 The Wood Basket 
The Russian coniferous resource, accounting for more than 70 percent of 
the forested land and nearly 80 percent of her volume, contains 552 
million hectares of stocked forest land and 64 billion cubic meters of 
growing stock (Figure 4 3  and Figure 4.4). The deciduous resource 
5 6 ~  detailed discussion of the Russian forest resources is available from (Backman 1994b). 
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amounts to 157 million hectares of forested land and 16 billion cubic 
meters, or approximately one-fifth of each of the total Russian stocked 
area and concomitant growing stock. The balance of 62 million hectares 
(8 percent) and 1.4 billion cubic meters (2 percent) consists of species 
which do not contribute a significant share of the aggregated inventory. 
While the forests of Russia can be credited with annual growth of more 
than one billion cubic meters, much of this potential is not realizable by 
the forest industry due to uses of the forest which conflict with timber 
extraction or accessibility affected transportation network or 
technological limitations.57758 It is these limitations, discussed below, 
which decrease the overall potential of the Russian forest resource by 
almost 50 percent to some 600 million cubic meters which could possibly 
be accessible by the forest sector.59760 
5 7 ( ~ a c k m a n  1995b. p. 4-7) 
5 8 ~ h e  annual growth potential of the Russian forest is a derived figure based on the sum of a number of 
composite figures. 
First, the forest growth potential is divided into 5 categories. The categories are: ( I )  low site; (2) reserve; (3) 
multiple use; (4) transportation & technology; and (5) current. The low site category identifies the share of 
the growth which is contributed by forested lands in the two lowest site classes of the Russian forest  
inventory, site class Va and v b .  These two site classes do not support sufficiently high enough stocking t o  
have been considered economically viable, even under the former centrally planned regime. Throughout 
Russia, some 100 million cubic meters of growth potential have been credited to these forests. 
Reserve forests reflect the share of the forest inventory which is not available for use by the forest sector due 
to either uses which directly conflict with harvesting or access limitations which cannot be addressed during 
the next twenty years. In total, 264 million cubic meters of the growth potential falls in this category. 
Multiple use factors are a derived value based on the different roles which the forest resources are placed. Thus ,  
for forests dedicated to protection, harvesting may be permitted but only if the protection role is no t  
endangered. The difference between the permitted harvest and what the forest (in which harvest is permissible) 
possibly could support in the absence of restrictions is the share of the growth potential allocated to th is  
category. Throughout Russia, an estimated 156 million cubic meters falls in this category. 
The category of transportation and technology encompasses the growth potential which cannot be presently 
realized due to either inappropriate harvesting technology or absence of infrastructure which cannot be  
supported solely by the forest sector. Throughout Russia, some 200 million cubic meters falls into th is  
category. 
The final category, current, represents the growth potential which is realistically available for use in the  
short to medium term. The volume is a maximum value, the share of which actually utilized depending o n  
economic criteria. Thus, the current growth potential is in terms of a "physically accessible" connotation.  
Throughout Russia, 417 million cubic meters falls under this category. 
5 9 ~ a c k m a n  ( 1 9 9 4 ~ ) .  p.2 
6 0 ~ h e  fiber flow figures are inclusive of a firewood component which varies from 2 4  percent for coniferous 
forest to 4 2  percent for deciduous forest according to (Goskomles 1991a). The share of the harvest from the  
coniferous forest is slightly lower according to ( F A 0  1994) however. The figure from Goskomles are believed 
to be more accurate as part of the harvest is believed not to be accounted for in the ( F A 0  1994) data set. 
4.1.2.1 Growth Potential 
Figure 4 5  shows the distribution of the growth potential among the 
different categories. Almost 10 percent of the forest growth potential, or 
100 million cubic meters, is supported by extremely low site forest 
unlikely to ever have utility for the forest sector.61 Another one-quarter 
(264 million cubic meters) is not realizable during the next two decades 
even with the infrastructure developmental priorities in the late 1980s 
under the former regime, and may in fact never be realizable in the 
longer-term due to environmental factors .62?63 Some 15 percent, or 156 
million cubic meters, are not presently available due to restrictions on 
harvest to accommodate protection values. Almost one-fifth (200 million 
cubic meters) while potentially available in the medium to longer term 
must depend on either additions of technology or infrastructural 
development not supportable solely by the forest sector to be 
realizable.64 Of the 1.1 billion cubic meters, less than 40 percent (417 
million cubic meters) remains which can be considered realistically 
accessible in the short to medium term.65 
Evident from Figure 4.6, the coniferous resource supports only 57 
percent of the short to medium term fiber potential, or some 236 million 
cubic meters. The deciduous forest resource supports the remaining 43 
percent of the fiber flow (182 million cubic meters).66 The coniferous 
resource is more heavily represented in the medium to long-term 
resource potentially accessible by the forest sector, accounting for 
almost two-thirds of the 200 million cubic meters falling in this category 
(130 million cubic meters). The deciduous forest support the remaining 
one-third of 70 million c~lbic meters.67 
6 I  (Backman 1994b. p. 75) 
62(1bid., p. 152) 
6 3 ~ l m o s t  80 percent of the 264 million cubic meters are located in East Siberia and the Far East. A large part 
of the reserve is located on permafrost areas raising questions of succession of a successfully re-established 
forest cover following harvesting. 
64(~ackman  1994c, p. 2) 
65(~bid. ,  p. 2) 
6 6 ( ~ a c k m a n  1995b. p. 7) 
67(1bid., p. 7) 
The share of the potential harvest which has commercial utility is 
examined, commenting on the apparent surplus existing between harvest 
and that potential. A long-term economic harvest level is advanced. 
4.2.1 Available Fiber 
The potential of the forest resource is realized through processing 
activities which start with the harvesting component. Through .the 
harvesting activity, solid wood raw material is generated which can be 
utilized to support the manufacture of more value added products, such 
as lumber, pu.lp, or reconstituted panel products, or utilized in 
unmanufactured form for a variety of uses, which includes pilings, 
dwellings and heating. However, not all of the fiber potential, identified in 
Section 4.1 has commercial utility. A portion of the harvested fiber is lost 
between the place of harvest and .the place of first processing while the 
harvest which is actually delivered and available consists of a non- 
commercial component. 
Accounting for both of these losses reduces the potentially realizable 
fiber from the forest resource over the medium to long term from 617 
million cubic meters to some 372 million cubic meters, two-thirds of 
which are believed available to the forest sector in the short to medium 
term (Figure 4.7). 
4.2.1.1 Fiber Loss 
Very little information exist which quantifies the share of the harvest 
potential which must be excluded due to losses incurred during the 
harvesting process. Backman (1993) developed an estimate of 13 
percent for all of Russia while Nilsson et alia (1992) identified a level of 
less than 10 percent for the European part of the former Soviet Union. 
Backman (1995b) employed a composite figure based on both estimates 
suggesting that the potentially harvestable forest volume must be scaled 
back by almost 10 percent. 
Thus, losses normally encountered in the harvesting process in Russia 
amount to some 55 million cubic meters of the 617 million identified as  
realistically accessible in the short to medium and medium to long terms. 
The short to medium term resource accounts for 38 million cubic meters 
while .the medium to long term forest resource accounts for 18 million 
cubic meters. 
4.2.1.2 Commercial Component 
The harvest potential of the Russian forests have been routinely 
presented inclusive of a firewood component. While the commercial 
component of the fiber potential varies depending on species and size of 
the resource as well as the range of manufacturing processes to which 
the resource can be directed, one-quarter of the coniferous resource and 
45 percent of the deciduous resource have not been utilized by the forest 
sector in the past. 
The commercial share of the coniferous forest resource thus is some 75 
percent while that in the deciduous resource amounts to 55 percent. The 
reduction linked to the non-commercial component amounts to 189 
million cubic meters in total leaving 250 million cubic meters in the short 
to medium term and an additional 123 million cubic meters in the medium 
to long term. 
4.2.2 Fiber Utilization 
Fiber utilization is discussed in terns of the historic utilization of the forest 
resource and its distribution between domestic consumption and export. 
An estimate of economic accessibility is then presented to provide an 
indication of how current harvest levels compare to two estimates of the 
equilibrium under a more stable domestic price and cost vector. 
4.2.2.1 Historic Utilization 
Since 1989, the degree to which the fiber potentially accessible by .the 
forest sector has been utilized has been falling. Shown in Figure 4.8, 
from nearly complete utilization of the short to medium term fiber supply 
in 1989, represented by a harvest of 439 million cubic meters, only 251 
million cubic meters were seemingly harvested in 1993, representing a 
utilization of 60 percent of the total Russian resource. The corresponding 
figure for 1992 is 78 percent. 
4.2.2.2 Economic Accessibility 
Developing an estimate of economic accessibility is rife with uncertainty 
given the fluctuating exchange rate and inflationary tendencies 
characteristic of the environment in Russia at the present time. Harvest 
levels evident in 1993 while reflecting the economic realities of that time 
period are not necessarily representative of the levels possible when the 
domestic price and cost matrix achieves some stability with the 
international level. Backman (1995b) however presented two estimates 
for long-term economic harvest by imposing a matrix of costs and prices 
on the Russian forest sector which reflected world levels 
Modified to incorporate firewood and harvest loss, Figure 4.9 shows that 
economic harvest levels in the short to medium fiber resource could 
amount to 23 1 million cubic meters while that in the resource available in 
the medium to long term could amount to 97 million cubic meters under 
the Base C a s e . 6 8 . 6 9  These values represent more than 55 percent of the 
harvest potential in the short to medium term resource and slightly less 
than one half in the medium to long term resource.70 
Presented in Figure 4.10 are estimated long-term harvest levels 
incorporating a higher price for roundwood available in the Pacific Rim 
market. In this case, the economic harvest levels amount to 308 million 
cubic meters in the short to medium term fiber and 145 million cubic 
meters in the medium to long-term fiber. These harvest levels represent 
6 8 ~ h e  figures presented in (Backman 1995b, p. 168) exclude the harvest loss and the firewood component.  
The figures presented in this section are inclusive of these two components to the overall fibre supply. 
6 9 ~ h e s e  figures are inclusive of the loss and non-commercial components. 
7 0 ( ~ a c k m a n  1995a. p. 7) presents 283 million cubic meters in the short to medium term resource and 1 4 3  
million cubic meters in the medium to long term resource as a long-term economic harvest level. These 
numbers were derived assuming that transportation distances were only domestic oriented. The shorter 
distances between the centre of gravity for harvesting and the domestic consumption centre of gravity when 
compared to the distance from the harvesting centre of gravity to the export market translated into a higher 
share of the overall maximum possible being considered economic. The figures presented above are based o n  
a domestic demand kept stable at an estimated 1993 level. Thus, harvest in excess of this level becomes 
economic only if it can support the higher transportation costs linked to the larger distances to the export  
market rather than the domestic market. Since the transportation distances to the export market are greater 
than to the domestic market, a smaller share of the forest resource can be expected to be economically 
accessible. 
three-quarters of the short to medium term maximum fiber possibly 
available and slightly more than 70 percent of .the medium to long-term 
maximum fiber potential. 
4.3 DOMESTIC ONSUMPTION A D EXPORTABLE SURPLUS 
The historical record of harvest, domestic consumption, and export are 
reviewed. The longer term outlook is then presented based on Backman 
(1995b). 
4.3.1 Historical Record 
The forest sector of Russia has relied on export markets to supplement 
.the domestic demand for roundwood generated through industrial 
activity (Figure 4.11). Commercial harvest available for distribution has 
been falling steadily since 1989 when 290 million cubic meters were 
produced. By 1993, harvest had fallen to an estimated 165 million cubic 
meters, slightly less ,than three-fifths the level existing four years earlier. 
The share allocated to the domestic industry rose slightly even as export 
opportunities diminished, particularly in the East European countries and 
in the republics previously belonging to the former USSR. In 1989, some 
85 percent of the domestic commercial volume was reserved for either 
domestic consumption or to support manufacture of forest products. By 
1992, the share reserved for the domestic industry had increased to more 
than 90 percent as export markets collapsed faster than those inside 
Russia. In 1992, an estimated 196 million cubic meters of commercial 
roundwood were directed to the domestic market. By 1993, export 
markets had begun to stabilize even though the decline continued in the 
domestic market. However, domestic consumption still accounted for 
some 90 percent of the domestically produced commercial roundwood 
(15 1 million cubic meters). 
Exporting 39 million cubic meters in 1989, representing 13 percent of 
commercial harvest, by 1992 roundwood exports had fallen to 17 million 
cubic meters, less than 8 percent of the commercial harvest of 213 
million cubic meters. The decline continued into 1993 with only 14 million 
cubic meters of a commercial harvest out of 165 million meters produced 
being exported (8 percent). 
While exports to countries beyond the borders of the former USSR have 
fallen by one-third from 19 million cubic meters to 12 million cubic meters 
since 1989, the export markets in the "near abroad" collapsed (Figure 
4.12). From 20 million cubic meters in 1989, exports to the near-abroad 
fell to only 2.9 million cubic meters in 1993, underscoring the declining 
opportunities which the Russian forest sector is facing. 
However, it is not just the export market for roundwood which supports 
economic activity in the harvesting sector. Russia is also an exporter of 
manufactured products which effectively doubles the share of 
commercial wood fiber supply depending on factors external to Russia. 
Although roundwood accounts for less than one-half of the exported 
fiber from Russia, opportunities presented by export of manufactured 
wood products have also declined. Despite this, however, export 
markets, even in 1993, supported 20 percent of the harvesting activity of 
Russia. 
Shown in Figure 4.13, of a total exported fiber of 82 million cubic meters 
on a fiber equivalent basis in 1989, 36 million were in roundwood form. 
By 1992, even though total exported fibre had decreased to 41 million 
cubic meters, unmanufactured roundwood accounted for less than one- 
half, or 15 million cubic meters. The decline continued into 1993 with only 
31 million cubic meters exported of which two-fifths, or 13 million cubic 
meters were in roundwood form. 
4.3.2 Prognosis 
An appreciation for long-term export opportunities cannot be made 
without considering the likely direction of domestic consumption. 
Increasing domestic consumption brought on by a successful social 
contract among the various participants of the Russian house will place 
increasing pressure on .the resource to meet higher consumption lirked 
to rising living standards. With the present environment in Russia, it is 
unlikely that domestic consumption in Russia would be allowed to suffer 
through unrestricted export of wood fiber, 
Backman (1995b) provides a window to the future through four 
scenarios for domestic consumption and exportable surplus. While the 
scenarios are based only on the fiber available in the short to medium 
term, the results help illustrate some of the policy areas which must be 
addressed by the international community, including that in Russia, if the 
wealth latent in the Russian forest resource is to be captured by both the 
Russian and international communities. 
Presented in Figure 4.14, continuation of demand evident in 1993, with 
the vector of world costs and prices imposed on the Russian forest sector 
system, suggest that some 40 million cubic meters will be surplus, 21 
million available for Pacific Rim markets and 19 million available for 
European markets. Development of the potential resource in the medium 
to long term can only add to the exportable surplus, though more to 
Pacific Rim and near abroad markets located on the southern periphery 
of Russia than to those existing in Europe. 
The export surplus is very sensitive to both capital investment and to 
increasing domestic demand brought on by a successful transition away 
from the centrally planned economy. Shown in Figure 4.15, the absence 
of capital investment leads to a rapid constriction of in the exportable 
surplus within 10 years, forcing the forest industry to meet domestic 
demand through import of a wide range of products. While such a 
scenario is unlikely, it serves to underscore the importance which the 
international and Russian policy formation communities should place on 
issues which affect on the investment climate. 
Conversely, shown in Figure 4.16, rising domestic demand, brought on 
by sustained 4 percent economic growth, and when coupled with 
accessible capital, effectively eliminates the export surplus within 15 
years following the start of growth. In the absence of the flow of fiber 
supported by the resource available in the medium to long term, the 
exportable surplus declines first for the European and near abroad 
regions, and disappears by the start of the third five year period. Modest 
exports to the Pacific Rim region continue into the third period but are 
completely absent by the start of the fourth. 
However, accounting for the higher prices available for unmanufactured 
forest products in the Japanese market has a large impact on the fiber 
surplus to domestic demand. Exports from Western Russia rise to 38 
million cubic meters from 19 million and to 45 million cubic meters from 
the eastern region from 21 million cubic meters (Figure 4.17). 
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5.0 OPPORTUNITIES 
The preceding chapter provided an appreciation of the opportunities 
presented by the forest sector while Chapter 3 emphasized some of the 
background environment which must be considered before embarking 
on a voyage to Russia. From these two chapters it can be seen that 
clearly opportunities exist. 
To provide some structure within which to view opportunities, this 
chapter is divided into two major parts. The first part identifies 
opportunities which are generic to Russia and are not industry specific. 
The second part focuses on the opportunities evident in the forest 
sector.7' 
Many organizations see Russia as a potential market for their products 
and a base from which to export to world markets. However, that 
potential is kept in check by a number of factors which have conspired to 
raise the political risk which has been assigned to Russia. Russia, ranking 
only second to Iraq by The Economist, is viewed as a risky place to do 
business, increasing the thresh hold rate of return and decreasing the 
time period demanded before the initial capital invested must be 
repatriated. 
Consequently, much can be accomplished if the perception of Russia as  
a risky place can be decreased in the eyes of the investor, foreign and 
domestic alike. This can be accomplished through a government that 
develops clear and well thought out action plans to deal with problems. 
The fundamentals of the market economy must be understood to avoid 
missteps and non-steps. Once policies have been determined by 
government, they must have a fair chance to be implemented. Therefore, 
government should have the ability to govern. Since democracy and the 
institutions and process supporting its operation are only recent arrivals 
However, despite the existence of these opportunities, their realization will depend on arranging adequate 
financing. The nascent state of the recovery in Russia would suggest that financial resources would be 
available for those activities which can demonstrate a more immediate return. Those opportunities which 
have benefits further into the future may need to be financed through sources other than those existing in 
Russia. 
to Russia, "democracy" consultants can act as facilitators as Russia and 
its institutions follow their path towards their own version of democracy. 
As the reform process continues, there are increasing opportunities for 
both foreign and domestic organizations and people to participate in the 
political, economic, and social development of Russia. The absence of a 
common understanding of the process by which a market economy and 
a democracy function from the Russian side, and the failure to appreciate 
the degree to which Russia is a relationship society built upon trust and 
unwritten understanding increases the chances for miscommunication, 
misunderstanding, and out right fraud. The code of conduct which forms 
part of the background environment which many participants from the 
West take for granted, is not present in Russia. The absence of a 
transparent code with which they are familiar and the existence of a 
Russian non-transparent code of behaviour does not inspire any degree 
of confidence in a dispute resolution process when treating foreigners in 
a balanced fashion viz-a-viz Russians. Thus, there is a need for a well 
thought out legal code which is both implementable and acceptable to all 
participants. While there are opportunities for consultants with skills in 
drafting the appropriate legislation and accompanying regulations with a 
view towards transparency, the converse is also true. Cultural 
interpreters who can place behaviour in both contexts can help to 
facilitate cementing of relationships among organizations from different 
countries and cultures which have a commercial incentive to do so. 
As the assets of the Russian state are being distributed back to the 
Russian peoples and to foreign organizations, many questions arise 
concerning their valuation in a market economy. While much information 
exists concerning the performance of the organizations, this information 
often was derived under a completely different economic, social, and 
political paradigm. 
Skills to establish their valuation under a market economy are not widely 
distributed among the Russian people. In order to broaden the appeal of 
Russia, mechanisms should be developed which can shed light on the 
degree to which accounting information generated by the former system 
can be employed to establish a realistic appraisal of the asset's value. 
Linked to this item is the broader question of information and the degree 
to which it can be independently verified. Thus, there are opportunities 
for consultants and organizations which can perform the valuation of 
assets in terms of a market paradigm and those which can provide 
sufficient due diligence to give credibility to the appraisals. 
Opportunities to participate in a growing export trade are clearly evident 
from Chapter 4. Additionally, a rapidly rising domestic consumption level 
brought on by a successful contract among the difference participants in 
Russian society could lead to sharply higher prices on the domestic 
market. Constraints to supply exist which when encroach upon can 
translate into a price structure in the forest sector rising faster than in 
other parts of the economy. Consequently, prospects may not only be 
present for those firms willing to develop for the export market the forest 
resource and concomitant industrial capacity, but those companies 
prepared to invest with an eye to servicing the domestic market in the 
medium to long term. 
While on a macro level the fundamentals seem to support investment in 
the forest sector, more micro oriented opportunities are presented below. 
They are discussed in terms of five sections: (1) informational; (2) forest 
resource; (3) forest utilization; (4) forest products trade; and (5) forest 
equipment manufacture. 
5.2.1 Informational 
Consistent with many other industrial sectors, there is a general absence 
of descriptive information providing a realistic picture of the current 
situation of the sector and what the likely prospects will be over the next 
decade or so. It is this lack of background knowledge which can form an 
initial barrier to companies having an interest to participate in the Russian 
forest sector. Thus, there are opportunities for purveyors of knowledge 
to prepare the fundamental reports which give structure to the overall 
industry and help investors place their opportunities in perspective. 
The purveyors of information can consist of two types. First, there is the 
macro level which helps to establish the overall fundamentals of the 
forest sector. Second, at the micro level are those companies or 
organizations which can perform due diligence assessing the prospects 
and opportunities of individual companies. In this category would most 
likely fdl many of the foreign accounting firms and emerging Russian 
organizations with intimate familiarity of the sector. 
5.2.2 Forest resource 
There is a long-term need to establish a better framework for managing 
the forest resources of Russia in a more intensive manner. Included is a 
closer examination of the degree to which the ability of the forests to 
support a flow of fiber is realistically reflected in bo.th allowable annual 
harvest including intermediate harvests. 
Not only is this important from a long term fiber flow view point, but it is 
also from the view point of export markets, particularly in Europe. 
Growing concern over the appropriateness of forest management 
techniques is becoming a major concern of consumers of manufactured 
products. Failure to convince consumers of the responsible manner with 
which Russia approaches its stewardship of the land could have far 
reaching consequences, artificially diminishing export opportunities. 
Accordingly, there are opportunities for consultants who can convey to 
the Russian forest sector establishment the ingredients of a forest 
management regime which will be positively viewed by foreign 
consumers, including the mechanisms to present it. 
Linked with the marketing strategy to convince foreigners of the 
soundness of Russian stewardship of the forest resources is the 
substance underlying it. Russia has a long and rich history linked with the 
forests and forest management. The absence of financial resources and 
a long period of isolation from outside influences has created an 
opportunity for exchange between outside and inside of Russia. 
Intensive forest management is probably more common outside of 
Russia, including the degree to which computers have been incorporated 
into management paradigms. Additionally, the need to accommodate the 
diversified interests served by the forest resource has meant that .the 
process of con~promise and consensus are more a part of the 
background environment which organizations outside bring to the 
negotiation table. Accordingly, expertise in handling the large volume of 
data connected with resource management through a computerized 
information system can be expected to be well received. Furthermore, 
the process of consensus building and the art of compromise, while not 
unknown in Russia, can benefit from the more tolerant regime which has 
evolved in the West. Thus, administrative structures which promote and 
support conflict resolution and consensus building should find a receptive 
ear. 
5.2.3 Forest utilization 
Connected with management practices of the forest resource are 
environmentally neutral manufacturing practices which do not contribute 
to degradation of the environment. Not only do consumers of forest 
products, particularly in Europe, have a growing sense of the importance 
of environmentally sound forest management practices, but the concern 
extends to the manufacturing process. Thus, the discharge of waste 
products generated during the manufacturing are an important 
consideration if Russia wishes to substitute increasingly manufactured 
products for the solid roundwood which now dominates the export of 
Russian forest products. 
An historical preference for coniferous species and the general absence 
of a well defined manufacturing industry which could successfully utilize 
the deciduous resource has resulted in their under harvest. Increasing 
capacity to utilize the lower grade material could very well translate into 
larger opportunities for the sale and manufacture of equipment to 
produce wood chip material from the lower grade wood now left 
unutilized or consumed as firewood for heating purposes. These 
opportunities are amply evident in the Russian Far East where currently 
a shortage of wood material has dramatically increased the price of by- 
product chips. Furthermore, increasing utilization of the waste material 
left either at the setting in the forest or at the lower landing cannot help 
but improve the perception that Russian is managing its resource in an 
efficient and responsible manner. 
5.2.4 Forest products trade 
While a system of grading standards has emerged inside Russia to help in 
the allocation of the forest resource and manufactured products among 
the different end uses and consumers, the system has not necessarily 
conformed to those standards which have emerged in the international 
community. Furthermore, the degree to which standards employed in 
Russia reflect what is actually delivered also is an important 
consideration from the view point of consumer satisfaction. 
Thus there are opportunities for development of the appropriate 
paradigm to translate the internal Russian grading system into a standard 
recognized in the international community as well as developing training 
programs and equipment which can permit the Russian manufacturer to 
extract the highest value product with consistent quality. 
Under the former regime, trade was the responsibility of specialized 
trading organizations. The manufacturing and harvesting enterprises d d  
not contain the necessary experience to market their products to either 
the domestic or the international market place. With the devolution of the 
centrally planned system, opportunities for the individual enterprises to 
deal more closely with actual consumers of their products have grown. 
The absence of marketing skills provides a window of opportunity for 
international organizations which can provide marketing services to 
enterprises inside Russia and opportunities to link into the international 
market place. 
5.2.5 Forest equipment manufacture 
Connected with the environmentally responsible manufacturing methods 
discussed earlier is the ability to produce products of quality lying above 
the minimum thresh hold value acceptable in the West. While trade in 
manufactured products accounted for a significant portion of the trade in 
products under the Soviet regime, much of the products exchanged with 
former members of the CMEA were of substandard quality which would 
not have met the expectations of consumers long accustomed to a higher 
quality standard. With much of ,the capital employed in the forest sector 
of a standard not capable of meeting a world level, opportunities exist for 
participation in the re-equipping of the industry. 
Thus, opportunities for fabricators of manufacturing equipment in all 
sectors of industry plus those manufacturers of pollution abatement 
equipment exist. Furthermore, producers of harvesting equipment that 
poses less of a hazard to the forest can find a receptive chord both in 
terins of increasing productivity on accessible forest sites and bringing 
into accessibility forest which hitherto has been inaccessible due to 
limitations of terrain. The introduction of more appropriate technology, in 
addition to bringing to accessibility a resource not considered available 
currently, will also contribute to building the perception that the Russian 
forests are being managed in a manner consistent with sustainable 
development principals. 
While markets seem to exist for manufacturers of equipment outside of 
Russia to compete in the domestic market, there may also be significant 
opportunities for equipment manufacturers to invest in the manufacturing 
sector of Russia, particularly in the transformation of the defense industry 
of Russia. Providing engineering and product design, the foreign investor 
may be able to take advantage of the familiarity of the domestic market 
and a significantly lower cost base either to manufacture for the re- 
capitalization of the existing industry or as a base from which to market 
forest equipment to a global market place. 
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